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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF : 
HUMAN SERVICES. OFFICE OF RECOVERY 
SERVICES, and CHILD SUPPORT : 
ENFORCEMENT, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant 
and Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 930654-CA 
LEE ALLEN RICHARDS, ET AL., Priority 15 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ORS 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of these consolidated appeals is conferred by-
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 1993). 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
The following statutes and rules are relevant to the 
determination of these appeals: Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7 (Supp. 
1993); Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1992); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-6 
(1992) ; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-8, -9 (1992) ; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
45a-2, -5 (1992); Utah Code Ann. § 62A-9-121 (1989); and Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1993). The full text of these provisions is 
set forth as Addendum A to this brief. 
ISSUE PRESENTED/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does a circuit court have subject matter jurisdiction of an 
independent civil action to collect past due child support ordered 
by a district court in a divorce, support, or paternity action? 
This issue presents a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness with no deference accorded to the trial court's 
determination. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851 
P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1993); Rimensburaer v. Rimensburger. 
841 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah App. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
These civil actions were filed in the Third Circuit Court, 
West Valley Department, by Child Support Enforcement, a private 
collection agency, to collect past due sums of unpaid child 
support1 from defendants. Richards R. 1; Jiminez R. 1-2; Pedersen 
R. 1-25; McCusker R. 1-27; Powell R. 1-2; Yarbough R. 1-2, 4; 
Feller R. 45. The defendants are all noncustodial parents whose 
monthly child support obligations (or other required payments in 
the nature of support) have been fixed and ordered by a Utah 
district court judge in the context of either a divorce or a 
paternity proceeding. Richards R. 1 (divorce); Jiminez R. 1-2 
(divorce); Pedersen R. 1-2 (divorce); McCusker R. 1 (divorce); 
Powell R. 1-2 (divorce); Yarbrough R. 1-2, 4 (paternity); Feller R. 
1-2 (divorce). 
At CSE's request, appellant Office of Recovery Services 
("ORS") was ordered joined as a party plaintiff in each action 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9(2) (1992) because the 
custodial parent, CSE's purported assignor, had received public 
xIn each case, the complaint sought less than the circuit 
court jurisdictional cap of $20,000. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7 
(Supp. 1993) . 
2 
assistance from the State of Utah.2 Richards R. 18; Jiminez R. 24; 
Pedersen R. 27-29; McCusker R. 26; Powell R. 20; Yarbrough R. 26; 
Feller R. 20. In each case, ORS opposed compulsory joinder on the 
basis that the circuit court has no subject matter jurisdiction to 
enforce a claim for past due child support ordered by a district 
court. Richards R.* 22-28; Jiminez R. 43-46; Pedersen R. 30-34; 
McCusker R. 29-33; Powell R. 23-27; Yarbrough R. 34-38; Feller R. 
21-24. The circuit court rejected this argument, concluding that 
it has subject matter jurisdiction over actions to enforce district 
court orders for child support once payment is past due. Richards 
R. 38-40; Jiminez R. 54-56; Pedersen R. 45-47; McCusker R. 41-43; 
Powell R. 23-27; Yarbrough R. 34-38; Feller R. 21-24. 
After a consolidated hearing, Circuit Court Judge Edward 
Watson delivered the oral ruling on the jurisdictional issue that 
was relied upon in each of the cases. Tr. of July 29, 1993 in 
State of Utah v. Richards. He concluded that once a court-ordered 
child support payment or other court-ordered payment by a 
noncustodial parent is past due, it changes from a child support 
2Section 78-45-9(2) provides: 
(2)(a) A person may not commence any action or file a 
pleading to establish or modify a support obligation or 
to recover support due or owing, whether under this 
chapter or any other applicable statute, without filing 
an affidavit with the court at the time the action is 
commenced or the pleading is filed stating whether public 
assistance has been or is being provided on behalf of a 
dependent child of the person commencing the action or 
filing the pleading. 
(b) If public assistance has been or is being provided, 
that person shall join the [Office of Recovery Services] 
as a party to the action. 
3 
obligation into a "debt" owed by the noncustodial parent. Such a 
debt, he reasoned, can be sued on in the circuit court just like 
any other debt, even though it arises from a district court order 
in a prior divorce or paternity action. Judge Watson concluded 
circuit court has concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with the 
district court to enforce such district court orders by way of a 
money judgment in an independent civil action in circuit court for 
past due sums, as long as the amount claimed is below the circuit 
court's monetary jurisdictional ceiling. Tr. at 25-26, 28, 32 
(attached as Addendum B) . However, Judge Watson expressly 
"decline[d] jurisdiction to determine anything about ongoing 
support or to become involved in visitation, contempt, or [a 
defendant's reasons for] failure to pay [support] in the past, or 
to alter in any way a decree of divorce," deferring to the district 
court's statutory jurisdiction of those matters. Id. at 26. 
Following involuntary joinder of ORS, money judgments (ranging 
from $930 to $15,700) were eventually entered in the Third Circuit 
Court in favor of CSE and against defendant in each case for past 
due child support or other district court-ordered payments, accrued 
interest, and court costs. Richards R. 47; Jiminez R. 61; Pedersen 
R. 55; McCusker R. 47; Powell R. 51; Yarbough R. 58; Feller R. 45. 
ORS timely appealed from the judgments in order to obtain from 
this Court a resolution of the important jurisdictional question.3 
3The related issue of whether the custodial parent's right to 
enforce a district court's child support order can be assigned to 
a third party other than ORS is already before this Court in State 
ex. rel. Parker v. Ferran, No. 930033-CA, currently on temporary 
remand to district court for entry of findings and conclusions. 
4 
Richards R. 54-55; Jiminez R. 64-65;, Pedersen R. 61-62; McCusker 
R. 56-57; Powell R. 54-55; Yarbough R. 60-62; Feller R. 51-52. The 
seven cases were subsequently consolidated on appeal as State v. 
Richards. No. 930654-CA.4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Legislature has expressly barred the circuit courts 
from considering claims for unpaid child support that arise from a 
district court's order in a divorce, support, or paternity action. 
Those actions are wisely centralized by the legislature under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts, which have 
continuing jurisdiction to oversee the collection of past due child 
support that they have originally ordered after taking into account 
all the circumstances of the parties. 
In these consolidated cases, the circuit court erroneously 
concluded that once payment is past due, a claim for monthly child 
support is severed from the original district court action from 
which the support order arose, becoming instead a generic "debt" to 
the custodial parent. Such a debt can be sued on in an independent 
civil action in circuit court, according to the circuit court, if 
the total claim is less than that court's monetary jurisdictional 
cap; however, no defenses to the "debt" obligation can be litigated 
in circuit court. 
This Court should reject the trial court's conclusion on both 
4Another, as yet unconsolidated, ORS appeal from the same 
ruling by Circuit Court Judge William A. Thorne on the 
jurisdictional issue is pending before this Court in State of Utah, 
Dep't of Human Services, Office of Recovery Services and Child 
Support Enforcement v. Cordova. No. 930804-CA. 
5 
statutory and public policy grounds. A claim for child support 
that arises from a prior district court order does not lose its 
nature as such the moment it becomes past due. The subject matter 
of the action is still child support, over which only the district 
courts have jurisdiction under Utah law. 
In addition to being prohibited by Utah's statutory scheme, 
the splintering of a continuing claim for monthly, district court-
ordered child support into multiple causes of action in multiple 
courts and court systems would be contrary to sensible public 
policy. It would increase the costs of child support litigation 
for all parties, including the State, waste judicial resources, and 
add confusion to the collection process, further thwarting all 
efforts to assure that natural parents financially provide for 
their children. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH LAW VESTS THE DISTRICT COURT WITH 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS FOR PAST 
DUE CHILD SUPPORT ORDERED BY A DISTRICT COURT, 
AND IT EXPRESSLY PROHIBITS THE CIRCUIT COURT 
FROM EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER SUCH CLAIMS. 
The jurisdictional limits of a statutorily-created court, such 
as the circuit court, are circumscribed by its empowering 
legislation. R, v. Whitmer In and For Salt Lake County, 30 Utah 2d 
206, 515 P.2d 617 (1973); Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 
(Utah App. 1987). Without jurisdiction over the subject matter, a 
court is without authority to proceed to the merits of a 
controversy, and any judgment or order entered by that court is 
null and void. Thompson, 743 P.2d at 1232; Van Per Stappen v. Van 
6 
Per Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah App. 1991). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (1992), the district 
court has broad "original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited 
by law." Accord Herzoa v. Bramwell. 82 Utah 216, 23 P.2d 345, 348 
(1933). No such broad authority has been conferred, by Utah's 
Constitution or statutes, upon the circuit courts. On the 
contrary, the Utah Legislature has substantially restricted, by 
subject matter as well as by amount in controversy, the circuit 
court's authority to entertain civil actions: 
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and 
equity, in all matters if the sum claimed in less than 
$20,000 . . . except: 
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity; 
. . . and 
(6) in all other actions, where, by statute, jurisdiction 
is exclusively vested in the district court or other 
trial or appellate court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7 (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). 
Further demonstrating the clear legislative intent to withhold 
from circuit courts any authority to consider child support claims 
regardless of amount, every statute relating to the imposition of 
or enforcement of a parent's obligation to support his or her child 
vests exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-1 to -37 (provision of statute regulating 
divorce proceedings, section 30-3-5, gives district court authority 
to enter orders relating to child support as well as continuing 
jurisdiction to modify such orders); Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-1 to -12 (section 78-45-6 
7 
grants district court jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under 
this act) ; Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45a-l to 
-17 (under section 78-45a-5(l), district court has jurisdiction of 
an action to establish paternity and power to enforce a judgment 
for child support, with continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke 
such judgment) ; Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 77-31-1 to -39 (section 77-31-10 vests jurisdiction of 
all proceedings under this act in the district court) ; see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6(1)(a) (Supp. 1993) (each payment under 
a child support order is, on and after the date due, "a judgment 
with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a district 
court"); Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1992) (each court has power to 
enforce its own judgments or orders in pending cases); Public 
Support of Children Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-301 to -504 
(1993) (authorizing enforcement of ORS's administrative support 
order, under section 62A-11-311(1) , by filing an abstract of it 
"with the clerk of any district court in the state"). 
Thus, section 78-4-7(2) expressly prohibits the circuit court 
from exercising jurisdiction over claims that arise from actions 
for divorce or paternity, which are different vehicles for securing 
court orders that mandate payment of child support by natural 
parents.5 In addition, the other statutes cited affirmatively 
5Utah's prohibition of circuit courts from enforcing child 
support orders, or other financial obligations arising from a 
divorce or paternity action is apparently typical. See 67A C.J.S. 
Parent and Child § 80 at 402 (1978) (absent statutory 
authorization, courts of limited jurisdiction may not enforce 
provisions of separation agreements, divorce decrees, or judgments 
of paternity and may not compel payment of child support or grant 
8 
place exclusive jurisdiction over claims for child support in the 
district courts--whether they arise there in the context of 
divorce, support, or paternity proceedings--thereby creating 
another insurmountable bar to circuit court jurisdiction over such 
claims by virtue of section 78-4-7(6). 
II. A CLAIM FOR RECOVERY OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS 
ORDERED BY A DISTRICT COURT DOES NOT--FOR 
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE CIRCUIT COURT'S 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION--CEASE BEING PART 
OF THAT DISTRICT COURT ACTION ONCE THE 
PAYMENTS BECOME PAST DUE. 
Notwithstanding this comprehensive statutory scheme for 
handling child support matters only in the district courts,6 the 
circuit court determined it could concurrently exercise a limited 
form of subject matter jurisdiction over some claims for child 
support by distinguishing between future and past due child 
support. The court ignored the plain language of both exceptions 
to circuit court jurisdiction in section 78-4-7 by erroneously 
characterizing district court-ordered child support payments--once 
past due--as no longer part of the district court divorce or 
paternity action in which the child support orders were entered. 
Tr. of July 29, 1993 at 25, 29. Instead, monthly child support 
payments transform on their due dates from child support claims 
money judgments for past support expenditures). 
6CSE has agreed before this Court that the statutes give 
district court sole subject matter jurisdiction over claims for 
past due child support. Brief of Appellant CSE at 22-25, State ex 
rel. Parker v. Ferran. 930033-CA; see note 3, supra. CSE 
nonetheless continues to argue the opposite view in the circuit 
courts. E.g., Richards R. 30-33. 
9 
into ordinary "debts" for a fixed amount, collectable in a circuit 
court action like any other contractual debt, as long as the sum 
claimed is less than the circuit court's monetary jurisdictional 
ceiling. Tr. at 25.7 
The sole basis for this transmogrification of the child 
support obligation is the following language in Baggs v. Anderson, 
528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added): 
[S]upport money can fall into two separate categories: 
First, the current and ongoing right of a child to 
receive support money from his father (parent); and 
second, the right to receive reimbursement for support of 
a child after that has been done. As to the second, 
suppose a father (parent) fails over a period of time to 
furnish support of the child, and the mother, or someone 
else furnishes it. That person then has a right to claim 
reimbursement from the parent, the same as any other past 
debt. This right of reimbursement belongs to whoever 
Tsicl furnished the support; and it is subject to 
negotiation, settlement, satisfaction or discharge in the 
same manner as any other debt. 
See Tr. at 25. This dicta does not support the circuit court's 
ruling on the jurisdictional issue here. As is evident from the 
complaints and other pleadings filed in the instant cases, these 
are not independent actions for reimbursement of past support 
supplied. These are actions seeking to enforce district court 
7Unlike defendants in other civil actions to collect a debt, 
however, a defendant in a child support debt action would not be 
permitted to litigate any reasons for failure to pay the past due 
support, such as nonoccurrence of a necessary condition precedent. 
Tr. at 25-26; see, e.g., Yarbrough R. 5-6 (support order in 
paternity judgment requires defendant to pay $104 each month, minus 
monthly health/dental insurance premium actually paid, plus one-
half the work related child care costs actually incurred by 
custodial parent). In the view of Judge Watson, matters such as 
contempt, custody, visitation, or alterations in the amount of 
support ordered remained in the district court, which may require 
"transfer" of the circuit court action to district court. Tr. at 
26, 32. 
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support orders that inextricably remain parts of the original 
divorce or paternity proceedings, over which the district courts 
have original and continuing jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 
30-3-5(3) (Supp. 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-5(l) (Supp. 1993); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1992) (each court has power to compel 
compliance with its own judgments and orders in pending cases). 
The characterization of unpaid, district court-ordered child 
support as a "debt" owed to a support provider is irrelevant to 
resolution of the jurisdictional issue. Describing accrued child 
support as a debt does not change the fact that the subject matter 
of an action on such a debt is child support ordered by a district 
court, a matter over which section 78-4-7 precludes the circuit 
court from exercising any jurisdiction.8 
In Herzog. 23 P.2d at 347-48, the Utah Supreme Court held in 
a mandamus action that the district court must assume jurisdiction 
over a petition to enforce the alimony payment terms of a prior 
district court divorce decree, even though resolution of the 
petition would require the district court to rule on the validity 
of the parties' purported post-decree contractual settlement of 
those past due alimony claims. ff [A] district court, having 
acquired jurisdiction of subject-matter and of the parties, has 
jurisdiction in the same action of all disputes and controversies 
presented by the pleadings arising out of or connected with the 
8The Public Support of Children Act, which authorizes ORS to 
enter administrative judgments for past due child support and then 
abstract them in the district court, likewise uses the term 
"support debt" to mean "the debt created by nonpayment of support." 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A 11-303(19) (1993). 
11 
same subject-matter of the action." Id. at 348; accord Emrich v. 
McNeil, 126 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (district court's 
jurisdiction over parties' prior divorce continued so that it, not 
inferior court, had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate 
subsequent child support claim). 
This Court should similarly hold that child support claims 
arising out of or connected with original divorce, support, or 
paternity proceedings in district court must, under Utah's 
statutory scheme, be settled in the context of the prior judicial 
action in district court, not in an independent action in circuit 
court. The circuit court's intervention orders and judgments 
should, accordingly, be vacated as null and void. 
This result is compelled by serious practical and public 
policy concerns as well as by the cited statutes. The ruling of 
the circuit court in the instant cases hopelessly fractionalizes a 
single domestic proceeding (for divorce, support, or paternity) in 
one district court into multiple causes of action that can be filed 
in numerous circuit courts. Under Judge Watson's reasoning, each 
past due monthly payment of court-ordered support during a child's 
years of minority can be a separate debt action in a circuit court, 
filed by the custodial parent and/or by ORS.9 (On the other hand, 
either the custodial parent or ORS may elect to accumulate claims 
9Utah law grants ORS standing, independent of the custodial 
parent's, to enforce the right to child support as an initiating or 
intervening party in a divorce, support, or paternity proceeding 
against the support obligor. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9 (1992) ; id. , 
§ 78-45a-2 (1992); i^, § 78-45a-5 (Supp. 1993); id^ § 62A-11-104 
(1993) . 
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for more than $20,000 in support arrearages, in which case Judge 
Watson's ruling would apparently require the filing of a new, 
independent "debt" action in district court, not circuit court.) 
However, if the custodial parent or ORS wants a court to hold the 
obligor in contempt for failure to pay child support, s/he or ORS 
must go back to the original action in district court. If the 
obligor wants to claim that, for any reason, s/he doesn't owe the 
past due support, see note 7 supra. s/he must convince the circuit 
court to "transfer" the case to district court, an act not even 
authorized by law, in order to litigate these matters. 
This fractionalization of what is, essentially, a single--but 
ongoing--cause of action for child support is nonsensical. It also 
needlessly increases the costs of support litigation for the 
parties, including both parents and ORS, who must appear and 
respond in two (or more) separate forums in multiple lawsuits. 
Permitting a new and separate action in circuit court to enforce a 
district court's prior support order, in contravention of section 
78-7-5(4),10 also wastes public judicial resources through 
duplicative filings in separate courts and court systems. 
Other practical considerations militate against recognizing 
any concurrent jurisdiction in the circuit court over child support 
matters. For example, support obligors (or their garnishees) would 
be subject to multiple, potentially overlapping post-judgment 
garnishment or attachment orders or judgment liens emanating from 
10The statute gives each court authority "to compel obedience 
to its judgments, orders, or process . . . in a pending action or 
proceeding." (Emphasis added). 
13 
two different court systems. There is no method for reconciling 
any such circuit court judgments and post-judgment judicial 
remedies relating to past-due support with those entered in the 
original district court action or with those abstracted in district 
court as ORS's administrative child support orders. Thus, it will 
be nearly impossible for either court, or for ORS, the custodial 
parent, or the support obligor to keep track accurately of what 
months of support have been reduced to a court judgment or a court-
abstracted agency order, as well as what months of arrearages have 
or have not been paid up. This chaos will, in turn, further 
handicap efforts to collect child support from delinquent parents. 
Just as importantly, a district court in a divorce, support, 
or paternity action, in exercise of its continuing jurisdiction and 
its authority to enforce its own judments or orders, must be able 
to enter judgments for support arrearages and subsequent equitable 
orders concerning execution on those judgments after taking a 
holistic view of the parties' obligations, duties, interests, and 
resources. For example, a district court may stay execution on its 
judgment for past due support as long as the obligor of limited 
means timely pays ongoing child support plus an extra amount each 
month toward the arrearages. Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2d 436, 491 
P.2d 231 (1971) (district court exercising continuing jurisdiction 
in divorce action has discretion to restrict execution on judgments 
for support arrearages to prevent the destruction of the means for 
payment of ongoing support). Similar authority and flexibility is 
given to the district court in support and paternity actions. Utah 
14 
Code Ann. § 78-45-8 (1992) (under Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Act, district court retains jurisdiction to modify or 
vacate orders of support "where justice requires"); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45a-5(l) (Supp. 1993) (under Uniform Act on Paternity, 
district court has continuing jurisdiction "to modify or revoke a 
judgment for . . . " necessary support") . In one of the instant 
cases, for example, the district court's paternity judgment and 
decree permitted the natural father to pay accrued child support by 
a future date certain, after which a district court judgment could 
be taken against him if the full amount was not paid. Yarbrough R. 
5-
If an obligee is permitted to obtain from circuit court a 
rubber-stamped circuit judgment for an excised period of past due 
child support, the district courts in the original proceedings will 
lose this essential flexibility and will, in effect, be divested of 
their statutory powers to make equitable orders regarding support 
of a child and to compel compliance with their own orders and 
judgments. 
In light of such realities, the appellate court in Emrich 
sagely determined that sound public policy required a district 
court with original jurisdiction over a parties' divorce--not an 
inferior municipal court in an independent action--to resolve all 
post-decree child support claims. 126 F.2d at 844. In reaching 
this conclusion, the court aptly noted, "No advantage to the 
parents, to the minor child, or to the well being of the people of 
the District could be accomplished by permitting such splitting up 
15 
of issues . . . ." Id. at 845. 
In sum, the circuit court's exercise of limited, concurrent 
jurisdiction over child support collection in Utah would be 
contrary to current law and would constitute undesirable public 
policy that would further hinder recovery of support from natural 
parents, adding confusion and cost to an already complicated area. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, ORS requests that this Court vacate 
the final judgments and intervention orders appealed from as null 
and void, and remand these cases to the Third Circuit Court with 
instructions that the complaints be dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
Respectfully submitted this %tk/ day of April 1994. 
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ADDENDUM A: Text of Relevant Statutes 
78-4-7 JUDICIAL CODE 
dOOOO( 
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o t o c e c i 
History: C. 1953,7Mg-103, enacted by L. 
1993, ch. 173, S 4. 
Sunset Act — Section 63-55-278 provides 
that the Citizen Review Panel Pilot Project is 
repealed April 1, 1995. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 173, * 6 
makes the act effective on July 1, 1993. 
CHAPTER 4 
CIRCUIT COURTS 
Section 
78-4-7. 
78-4-11. 
Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions. 
Appeals to Court of Appeals — 
Prosecuting attorney to repre-
sent state — City attorney to 
represent municipality. 
Section 
78-4-19. 
78-4-23. 
78-4-24. 
Repealed. 
Remission of monies collected. 
Repealed. 
78-4*7. Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions. 
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and equity, in all matters if 
the sum claimed is less than $20,000, exclusive of court costs, interest, and 
attorney fees, except: 
(1) in actions to determine the title to real property, but not excluding 
actions to foreclose mechanics liens; 
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity; 
(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code; 
(4) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative 
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer; 
(5) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs; and 
(6) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively 
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-4-7, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 77,1 1; 1983, ch. 76, t 1; 1986, ch. 
121, I 1; 1988, ch. 248, i 31; 1991, ch. 268, 
I 31; 1992, ch. 127, f 13. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27,1992, inserted "inter-
est, and attorney fees'* in the undesignated in-
troductory language. 
otooool 
lOOGGOi 
GlCCCii 
COCGCCi 
cmcocoi 
C i e c r t i 
-©©GGG-Cj 
78-4*11. Appeals to Court of Appeals — Prosecuting attor-
ney to represent state — City attorney to repre-
sent municipality. 
Except as otherwise directed by Section 78-2*2, appeals from final civil and 
criminal judgments of the circuit courts are to the Court of Appeals. The 
county attorney or district attorney as provided under Sections 17-18-1 and 
17-18-1.7 shall represent the interests of the state as public prosecutor in any 
appeals of criminal matters prosecuted by the county attorney in the circuit 
court. City attorneys shall represent the interests of the state in any appeals 
of criminal matters prosecuted by the city attorney and the interests of munic-
ipalities in any appeals involving violations of municipal ordinances. 
54 
GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND JUDGES 78-7-5 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 36. oppose, order closing criminal proceedings to 
CJ.S. - 21 CJ.S. Courts J 121. P U ^ C ' J M ^ * , 4 - 7 6 - , - , • 
f Prejudicial effect of improper failure to ex-
AX.R. — Effect of witness' violation of order elude from courtroom or to sequester or sepa-
of exclusion, 14 AX.R.3d 16. rate state's witnesses in criminal case, 74 
Standing of media representatives or organi- A.L.R.4th 705. 
xations to seek review of, or to intervene to Key Numbers. — Courts *» 79. 
78-7-5. Powers of every court 
Every court has authority to: 
(1) preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence; 
(2) enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person autho-
rized to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority; 
(3) provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its offi-
cers; 
(4) compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the 
orders of a judge out of court, in a pending action or proceeding; 
(5) control in furtherance of justice the conduct of its ministerial offi-
cers, and of all other persons in *ny manner connected with a judicial 
proceeding before it in every matter; 
(6) compel the attendance of persons to testify in a pending action or 
proceeding, as provided by law; 
(7) administer oaths in a pending action or proceeding, and in all other 
cases where necessary in the exercise of its authority and duties; 
(8) amend and control its process and orders to conform to law and 
justice; 
(9) devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, consistent 
with law, necessary to carry into effect its authority and jurisdiction; and 
(10) enforce rules of the Supreme Court and Judicial Council. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, § 1; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Acknowledgments, 
Supp., 104*7-5; L. 1988, ch. 248, t 41. power to take, § 57-2a-3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- Contempt generally, § 78-32-1 et seq. 
znent, effective April 25, 1988, added Suhsec- Power to solemnize marriages, § 30-1-6. 
tion (10) and made minor stylistic changes Subpoenas, §§ 78-24-4 to 78-24-6. 
throughout. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Vacating orders. and cannot be vacated by the order of another 
Order of district court finding "mother in con- district judge nine years later. Peterson v. Pe-
tempt and suspending child support is valid terson, 530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 3d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts i 64 ing or pending trial as ground for contempt 
et seq. proceedings or other disciplinary measures 
CJ.S. — 17 CJ.S. Contempt § 43. against member of the bar, 11 A.L.R.3d 1104. 
AXJL — Interference with enforcement of Appealability of acquittal from or dismissal 
judgment in criminal or juvenile delinquent ofchargeofcontemptofcourt, 24 A.L.R.3d650. 
case as contempt, 8 A.L.R.3d 657. Appealability of contempt adjudication or 
Release of information concerning forthcom- conviction, 33 A.L.R.3d 448. 
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78-45-5 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-45-5. Duty of obligor regardless of presence or resi-
dence of obligee. 
An obligor present or resident in this state has the duty of support as 
defined in this act regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee. 
History: L. 1957, eh. 110, 8 5. 
Meaning of "tbis act" — See note under 
same catchline following § 78-45-1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Desertion Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife •» 4; 
and Nonsupport §§ 32, 95. Parent and Child *» 3.1(5). 
78-45-6. District court jurisdiction. 
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under 
this act. 
History: L. 1957, cb. 110, ( 6. Meaning of "this act" — See note under 
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction same catchline following § 78-45-1. 
of district court, t 78-3-4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. —20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 147 
et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Courts •» 156. 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebutta-
ble guidelines. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court 
order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on the part of 
the obligor or obligee. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has 
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall re-
quire each party to file a proposed award of child support using the guidelines 
before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing award may 
be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court 
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of 
others. 
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-9 
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction. 
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order of support 
where justice requires. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, S 8. 
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction 
of district court, § 78-3-4. 
78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support. 
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor, and 
the office may proceed pursuant to this chapter or any other applicable 
statute, either on behalf of the Department of Human Services or any 
other department or agency of this state that provides public assistance, 
as defined by Subsection 62A-11«303(3), to enforce the right to recover 
public assistance, or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right 
of support against the obligor. 
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced by the office to enforce 
payment of the obligor's support obligation, it shall be the duty of the 
attorney general or the county attorney of the county of residence of the 
obligee to represent the office. 
(2) (a) A person may not commence any action or file a pleading to estab-
lish or modify a support obligation or to recover support due or owing, 
whether under this chapter or any other applicable statute, without filing 
an affidavit with the court at the time the action is commenced or the 
pleading is filed stating whether public assistance has been or is being 
provided on behalf of a dependent child of the person commencing the 
action or filing the pleading. 
(b) If public assistance has been or is being provided, that person shall 
join the office as a party to the action. The office shall be represented as 
provided in Subsection (l)(b). 
(3) As used in this section "office" means the Office of Recovery Services 
within the Department of Human Services. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, $ 9; 1975, ch. 96, owing that obligee whether under this act or 
I 23; 1977, ch, 145, § 11; 19S2, ch, 63, § 2; any other applicable statute without first filing 
1989, ch. 62, § 23; 1990, ch. 183, § 59. an affidavit with the court at the time the ac-
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- tion is commenced stating whether that obli-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, designated the gee has received public assistance from any 
first sentence of Subsection (1) as (l)(a) and source"; designated the second and third sen-
rewrote the provision which read: The obligee tences of Subsection (2) as (2)(b) and rewrote 
may enforce his right of support against the the provision which read: "If the obligee has 
obligor and the state Department of Social Ser- received public assistance, the obligee shall 
vices may proceed pursuant to this act or any join the Department of Social Services as a 
other applicable statute, either on its behalf or party plaintiff in the action. The Department 
on behalf of the obligee to enforce the obligee's of Social Services shall be represented as pro-
right of support against the obligor"; desig- vided in Subsection (1) of this section"; and 
nated the second sentence of Subsection (1) as added Subsection (3). 
(1Kb) and substituted "office" for "state depart- The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
ment of social services" and "the office" for 1990, substituted "Human Services" for "Social 
"that department" therein; designated the first Services" in Subsections (l)(a) and (3). 
sentence of Subsection (2) as (2)(a) and rewrote Cross-References. — Enforcement of sup-
the provision which read: "No obligee shall port provisions by Department of Human Ser-
commence any action to recover support due or vices, § 62A-1-111. 
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-2 
78-45a-2. Enforcement. 
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, child, puta-
tive father, or the public authority chargeable by law with the support of the 
child. If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to 
the laws of this state, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same 
or other proceedings: 
(1) by the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or 
may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, educa-
tion, necessary support, or funeral expenses; and 
(2) by other persons including private agencies to the extent that they 
have famished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, edu-
cation, necessary support, or funeral expenses. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 168, S 2; 1990, eh. 
245, 5 23. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "puta-
tive father" in the first sentence and made 
minor stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Enforcement of provi-
ANALYSIS 
Estoppel and laches. 
Evidence. 
—Conception and birth. 
Right to counsel. 
—Indigent prisoners. 
Blood tests. 
Discretion of court. 
Standard of proof. 
—Preponderance of evidence. 
Estoppel and laches. 
Under appropriate circumstances, laches 
may bar an action for paternity. Borland v. 
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). 
A paternity action brought six years after 
the birth of the child was not barred by laches, 
where defendant made no factual showing to 
support his argument that he was prejudiced 
by the delay. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 
144 (Utah 1987). 
Evidence. 
—Conception and birth. 
Where child was conceived while mother was 
married to her first husband and born while 
she was married to her second husband, the 
child was legitimate whichever husband was 
the father, and testimony by mother that dis-
puted second husband's fatherhood and sup-
ported first husband's fatherhood would not 
illegitimize the child and was properly admis-
sible in paternity action against first husband. 
Roods v. Roods, 645 P^d 640 (Utah 1982). 
sions by Department of Human Services, 
§ 62A-M11. 
Office of Recovery Services to perform duties 
of Department of Human Services in collecting 
child support, § 62A-11-104. 
Public support of children, §§ 62A-11-301 to 
62A-11-332. 
Right to counsel. 
—Indigent prisoners. 
Blood tests. 
While due process does not require Utah to 
appoint counsel for all indigent prisoners who 
are defendants in paternity cases, there may be 
some complicated paternity suits in which the 
risks of error would be high enough that the 
presumption against the right to appointed 
counsel would be overcome; given the avail-
ability and quality of the blood tests, there is 
no need for appointment of counsel prior to the 
time the tests are given. Nordgren v. Mitchell, 
716 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1983). 
——Discretion of court 
Due process of law does not require that all 
indigent, incarcerated defendants in paternity 
actions must always be appointed counsel; 
whether due process requires the appointment 
of counsel in such cases is vested in the discre-
tion of the trial court. Nordgren v. Mitchell, 
524 F. Supp. 242 (D. Utah 1981), affd, 716 F.2d 
1335 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Standard of proof. 
—Preponderance of evidence. 
The applicable standard of proof where pa-
ternity is asserted is "by a preponderance of 
the evidence." Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 
(Utah 1982). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-5 
78-45a-5. Remedies. 
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action under this act and all 
remedies for the enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and 
confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or fiineral expenses 
for legitimate children apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify 
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All reme-
dies under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available 
for enforcement of duties of support under this act. 
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the 
state Department of Human Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee or 
in its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title to 
enforce that right of support against the obligor. In such actions by the depart-
ment, all the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title shall be equally applicable 
to this chapter. Whenever a court action is commenced by the state Depart-
ment of Human Services, it shall be the duty of the attorney general or the 
county attorney, of the county of residence of the obligee, to represent that 
department. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96, 
! 24; 1990, ch. 183, § 60. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, guhstituted 
"Human Services" for "Social Services" twice 
in Subsection (2). 
Meaning of "this a c t " — See note under 
same catchdine following § 78-45a-4. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Ac t — The Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act, referred to in the 
last sentence in Subsection (1), is Chapter 31 of 
Title 77. 
Interests of mother and state. 
Jurisdiction. 
—Minority of putative father. 
Powers of the court. 
Interests of mother and state. 
In an action pursuant to the Uniform Act on 
Paternity, the state has a separate interest 
from that of the mother. The state and the 
mother are not in privity because each has sep-
arate interests and legal rights over which the 
other has no control. State ex rel. State Dep't of 
Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah 
C t App. 1987). 
Compiler's Notes. — Chapter 45b of this 
title, referred to in Subsection (2), was repealed 
by Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 407. For present compa-
rable provisions, see §§ 62A-11-301 through 
62A-11-328. 
Cross-References. — Creation of Depart-
ment of Human Services, { 62A-1-102. 
General duties of attorney general, § 67-5-1. 
General duties of county attorney, § 17-18-1. 
General jurisdiction of district court, 
i 78-3-4. 
—Minority of putative father. 
District court, and not the juvenile court, has 
jurisdiction over action brought under the Urn-
form Act on Paternity, when the putative fa-
ther is a minor. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't 
of Social Servs. v. Dick, 684 P.2d 42 (Utah 
1984). 
Powers of the cour t 
The Uniform Paternity Act does not endow a 
district court with subject matter jurisdiction 
to terminate the parent-child relationship or to 
permanently relieve a parent of his or her sup-
port obligations. Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 
1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Jurisdiction. 
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PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 62A-9-121 
(3) For the purpose of providing assistance to persons subjected to ex-
traordinary problems of living, by reason of any special situation, 
monthly payments may be made within rules devised to meet those situa-
tions, such as an allowance to meet the special needs of pregnant women. 
(4) Because of the unpredictability of public assistance and medical 
benefits, the governor is authorized to supplement the annual appropria-
tion at the close of any fiscal year for medical benefits or public assis-
tance, by deficit spending in an amount not exceeding 2% of the total 
work program of federal and state funds allocated for the fiscal year; and 
the Legislature, at its next annual general session, shall appropriate any 
supplemental funds that the governor may have authorized for medical 
benefits or public assistance. 
History: C. 1953,62A-9-119, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 1, § 236; 1988, ch. 242, S 24. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutionality. and not invidious discrimination in violation of 
Provision of former statute whereby larger equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amend-
families were paid disproportionately smaller ment of United States Constitution. Utah Wel-
percentage of actual need than smaller fami- fare Rights Org. v. Lindsay, 315 F. Supp. 294 
lies was consistent with the Social Security Act (D. Utah 1970). 
62A-9-120. Calculation of General Assistance Grants. 
Grants for General Assistance made pursuant to Subsections 62A-9-114(2) 
and (3), to the extent that those payments are made on an ongoing basis for 
persons who are unemployable, shall be calculated in a manner analogous to 
that provided in Subsections 62A-9-119Q), (2), and (3). However, the ratable 
reduction for General Assistance may differ from that imposed on other pro-
grams. 
History: C. 1953,62A-9-120, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 1, § 237; 1988, ch. 242, fi 25. 
62A-9-121. Assignment of support. 
(1) The department shall accept an assignment of support from each appli-
cant or recipient regardless of whether its payment is court ordered. Any right 
to support from any other person which has accrued at the time the assign-
ment is executed or, if none is executed, at the time of application for assis-
tance, and which an applicant or recipient has in his own behalf, or in behalf 
of any other family member for whom the applicant or recipient is applying 
for or receiving assistance, passes to the department under the assignment or 
by operation of law upon the receipt of assistance by the recipient, even if the 
recipient has not executed and delivered an assignment to the department. 
(2) An assignment of support or a passing of rights by operation of law shall 
include payments ordered, decreed, or adjudged by any court within this state, 
any other state, or territory of the United States and is not in lieu of, and shall 
not supersede or alter, any other court order, decree, or judgment. 
(3) When an assignment is executed, the applicant or recipient is entitled to 
regular monthly assistance and the support paid the department is a refund. 
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DIVORCE 30-3-5 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court com-
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch. missioners, effective April 23, 1990. 
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment, 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Division of debts 
— Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Cus-
tody and visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meri-
torious petition for modification [Effective until 
January 1, 1994]. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment 
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabil-
ities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) TTie court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and neces-
sary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
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ADDENDUM B: Transcript of Bench Ruling 
recalcitrant parent, under the order of the district 
court, has failed to do so. That is the factual 
situation that is brought to this court in most of the 
cases. 
The Court is aware of the letter from Judge Murphy. 
And I can say on my own that when I first reviewed these 
cases I had a little bit of concern myself. And I 
directed Mr. Johnston to show to me what authority he 
had to bring it into the circuit court. And so he filed 
a memorandum. I reviewed it, and then these matters 
were set as they are. 
This Court finds that — and concludes from the 
factual situation, the memorandums submitted and the 
argument, that the circuit court does have subject 
matter jurisdiction over a child support obligation 
ordered by the district court that is past due. The 
Court is making a distinction as — and consistent with 
that, which is arrived at in the case cited by the 
plaintiff of Baggs vs. Anderson, and makes that same 
distinction between an ongoing order of support and a 
past order that has not been paid. 
The Court concludes that such is a debt, can be 
recovered in a monetary court of jurisdiction, as is the 
court court, as any other debt may be. That in these 
cases where the custodial parent, who has not been 
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provided child support as ordered by the district court 
has provided that support, or any other third person who 
.has done so, they may bring an action in the circuit 
court on a debt that is due and recovered. 
This Court declines jurisdiction to determine 
anything about ongoing support or to become involved in 
visitation, contempt, or failure to pay it in the past, 
or to alter in any way a decree of divorce, this Court 
recognizing that the district court has the jurisdiction 
in those matters. 
Mr. Welker, you raised the issue that there may be 
a situation arise, and may have done in your case, 
wherein the custodial parent has denied the obligor 
parent visitation rights, and thus has not paid the 
child support. I can see that occurring. But it is the 
opinion of this Court if that does occur, the situation 
is not to pay, but to pay into court, into the district 
court, the child support, and then to bring an action in 
re contempt for failure to provide visitation. 
And so there is a remedy to cover that situation. 
And so this Court is concluding that any matters 
relating to interchange of parties, visitation, 
contempt, custody, any of those kinds of issues remain 
in the district court. The Court finds that in no 
instance in any of these cases has the plaintiff, Child 
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Support Enforcement, brought its action under the child 
support enforcement provisions of the state law. 
MR. WELKER: Your Honor, excuse me if I may. I 
have reviewed that in the action in the Guild case 
paragraph 14 there is a reference in the citation to the 
Section 78-45-9 of the act. And I'm assuming what 
they're saying here is that they are complying with the 
act by providing an affidavit, which certainly indicates 
that they are bringing the action under the act. 
THE COURT: It raises the support — I'm 
referring to that case in particular, paragraph 14 of 
the complaint, the support of the foregoing periods of 
time was not provided by the State of Utah or any public 
assistance program. An affidavit of that custodial 
parent is required by Utah (inaudible) Section 7 8-45 
(inaudible) is attached here to, and by this reference 
(inaudible). 
I am assuming what he is saying there, the way I 
read that, it's not that he's bringing this action under 
that particular act, but they had — his client assignee 
has — assignor has filed an affidavit saying that the 
state was not to be joined because they did not receive 
public assistance. I don't think — and I don't read 
that as meaning they are bringing it under this act. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: That is correct, your 
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Honor. 
THE COURT: That's how I read that paragraph. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: I — I read it differently 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: I understand. The Court therefore 
finds that the circuit court does have juris ~ subject 
matter jurisdiction in this case. The motions to join 
the State of Utah are granted. These matters will then 
be set for hearing. 
MS. DIXON: Tour Honor, excuse me, two 
questions. Why would the state be joined if they're not 
child support? 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
MS. DIXON: Why would the State of Utah be 
joined if it's not — 
THE COURT: I said that the state may wish to 
be joined. And that's the reason I told Mr. Johnston he 
had to join them, because you may have some claim 
against the — the custodial parent for reimbursement. 
And you may want to have input into the action to have 
part of that judgment awarded to you to recover what you 
may have expended during the period of time when she's 
not actually recovering. 
Most of these cases came to this Court on this 
basis. An affidavit was signed by the custodial parent 
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that during a period of time from say January 1, 19 9 3 to 
July 1, 1993, the custodial parent was not receiving 
welfare assistance. And so this claim filed in the 
circuit court was to recover the debt for that period of 
time. 
My position was even though you are saying during 
that small frame of time your client — assignor was not 
on welfare assistance, the State of Utah (inaudible) 
still have a claim, if it had provided assistance in the 
past. Because you may have signed — you as assignor 
may have signed a document that says any moneys we 
recover we will reimburse the state. And that's why I#m 
saying you are joined. 
And I know that looks a little bit inconsistent, 
but I'm saying this is not support because the debt 
arises from the support obligation. If you choose not 
to want to be joined and to ask for that, then you may 
simply file documents saying we are aware we have no 
claim, you may proceed without us. 
MS. DIXON: Tour Honor, we have asked in each 
of these cases not to be joined, and if the Court has 
deemed them to be merely a debt, not to be part of the 
action. The difficulty for the state is then we become 
subject to two forums, and we end up in two different 
forums trying to adjudicate the same issues essentially. 
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As is being indicated in testimony today, some of 
these cases we are presently enforcing the current 
obligation, and there is no assignment to CSE for 
periods in which the obligor is not paying after the 
ongoing (inaudible). 
So there will be additional — or potentially can 
be additional arrearages that will accrue that we will 
have the responsibility to go in and get on behalf of 
the obligee. And it will be very difficult for us if we 
end up in two forums• 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Your Honor, I think that 
matter can easily be remedied by the state simply filing 
a waiver reciting to them that they do not have a claim 
for X period to T period (inaudible). 
MS. DIXON: My apologies, your Honor, but we 
definitely do not want to file a waiver. Sometimes we 
do not have all the pleadings, sometimes we do not have 
adequate information to know whether or not we do have a 
claim. And I don't want to file anything or have any 
type of waived right of the state with inaccurate 
information. 
The other concern I would express to the Court, and 
just to express a clarification of the Court's 
determination today, 30-3-10.6 is the provision 
regarding the automatic nature of judgments in this 
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particular arena. I would like to know, is it the 
Court's determination then, when a child support 
obligation is due, that without a proceeding in which 
the Court has in fact adjudicated the amount, will CSE 
be entitled to come to the circuit court, or will they 
have to obtain an adjudicated amount or the obligee 
obtain that amount before (inaudible)? 
THE COURT: I will more specifically address 
that. 
US* DIXON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: The consideration of this Court 
will be that the plaintiff here will not have to reduce 
the past child support to judgment in the district court 
before he may proceed in this court. And I know there 
are some problems that will have to be worked out, but 
that is the position of this Court. And I guess we'll 
have to take it (inaudible). 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Tour Honor, again on 
(inaudible) and I'm not sure exactly what the Court 
means, but in the event that we have some defense to --
that's not particularly a monetary defense, withholding 
visitation I know the Court indicated that we could go 
to district court for the contempt. Is it the view of 
the Court then that we would have an action ongoing in 
this court, and then we would also have to take our 
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action to district court; or would we take our whole 
action to district court to deal with all aspects of the 
case? 
THE COURT: I'm not saying that the circuit 
court has exclusive jurisdiction. If there was, as I 
view it, a failure to pay child support, and there is 
thought in the mind of the defendant some justification 
for that, and by affidavit that is presented to this 
Court, this Court might be willing to transfer the whole 
case to the district court, including the monetary 
claim, because of that. But I can see no reason why a 
person should fail to pay the child support without 
going to the jurisdiction for a contempt (inaudible) 
refusal of visitation. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: But would the Court hear 
the defendant's arguments on its merits, or would the 
Court feel like it has jurisdiction to do that? 
THE COURT: I would not entertain jurisdiction 
to determine contempt. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: And so our procedure then 
would be to file something to the court to transfer it 
back to district court if we wanted to pursue that? 
THE COURT: I would think that's what would 
have to be done. 
SPEAKER UNKNOWN: Thank you. 
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